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Special Issues
American Indian Tribal Death-A
Centennial Remembrance
DANIEL L. ROTENBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 200th birthday of the United States Constitution will pro-
duce a profusion of patriotic phrases, and well it should. At the same
time, however, another historic event is worth noting. One hundred
years ago, on May 10, 1886 to be precise, American Indian sover-
eignty died. It was a clean and quiet death. Cavalry troops were not
to blame, neither was Congress nor the President. Rather, the least
dangerous branch of the federal arsenal pulled the trigger. The
Supreme Court nine unanimously agreed in United States v. Kagama I
that Indian tribes could no longer resist congressional laws simply by
rejecting them. Congress alone could govern the tribes. With this
single judicial pronouncement the political independence of the
American Indian tribe was put to rest forever. A centennial remem-
brance of what happened is a small way to mark the occasion.
II. THE BACKGROUND
In the beginning, when the Europeans "discovered" America,
they were met by natives already in residence. This unexpected pres-
ence meant that the land was not discoverable territory. What to do?
One alternative under international law was to brand the Indians
unworthy heathens. The discoverers could then ignore the Indian's
claims to land and even disregard their claims to life, unless the Indi-
ans first adopted European religion.2 A more civilized alternative,
* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
1. 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886).
2. International law of the time was not really "international." It was both western
world and Christian in perspective and coverage. A purported state that did not meet the
double qualification was simply beyond the realm. See 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 117-22 (1970). Of course, international "morality" was considered a proper standard to
apply to the heathens, savages, or outsiders, where this could be done meaningfully. Not
everyone held this generous attitude. "Of the natives, however, very little account was made.
Being heathen, they were not, in the age succeeding the discovery of America, regarded as
having rights, but might be subdued and stript of sovereignty over their country without
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however, prevailed. Credit for this choice apparently goes to the
Spanish theologian Francisci de Victoria.3 His conclusion was that
the Indians owned their land4 and that war by whim5 against them
would violate international law. The European powers cooperatively
accepted the limitations. To forestall disputes among themselves,
however, they agreed that under the "right of discovery" the discover-
ing nation would have the first opportunity to purchase Indian land
whenever it was put up for sale. In effect this meant that the Indian
tribes could sell to no one but European nations because these discov-
ering nations would always buy whatever land was available. Of
course, if the Indians chose never to sell, then there would be no land
to buy. This civilized thinking about Indian land carried over to
other matters as well. The tribes were sovereigns; the legal method of
transaction was treaty.
III. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
This sovereign status of the American tribes survived the Colo-
nial days,6 the Confederation, 7 the Northwest Ordinance,8 the draft-
compunction." T. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 66
(6th ed. 1906).
3. Victoria (or Vitoria) (1480(?)-1546) was a professor of theology at the University of
Salamanca from 1526 until his death. He was advisor to the Spanish crown and has been
called the father of modern international law. His views and influence are discussed in Cohen,
The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 9-21
(1942).
4. "The upshot [of earlier analysis] is, then, that the aborigines undoubtedly had true
dominion in both public and private matters .. .and that neither their princes nor private
persons could be despoiled of their property on the ground of their not being true owners." F.
VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES § 11, at 128 (E. Nys ed. 1917).
5. A just war, such as one waged in self-defense, was proper against the Indians as it was
against Christian nations.
6. It was not to be expected that the refinements of modern international law as Professor
Victoria and others formulated them would find their way into the everyday practice of the
colonists. Nevertheless, to a suprising extent they did.
[W]hatever loose opinions might have been entertained . .. in favor of the
abstract right to possess and colonize America, it is certain that in point of fact
the colonists were not satisfied, or did not deem it expedient to settle the country
without the consent of the aborigines. . . .They always negotiated with the
Indian nations as distinct and independent powers ....
3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 89-90 (14th ed. 1896). Of course, the colo-
nists were not solely motivated by law or even morality. The desire for marketable titles to
land and cordial relations with their neighbors prompted the colonists to favor mutual agree-
ment over unilateral power. Whatever the motivation, practice supported the law.
7. The two places in the Articles of Confederation where Indians are mentioned did not
alter the original status of the tribes. Article VI provided that a state could engage in war if it
"shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to
invade such State" and the danger was imminent. Article IX provided that the Congress shall
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ing of the Constitution, 9 and the Constitution itself. The Constitution
barely mentioned the Indians and no amendments since have changed
the situation. Aside from two identical references which exclude
Indians from official population tabulation, I° the only express refer-
ence to the Indians in the entire Constitution is in the commerce
clause. It provides that "Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes ...... "1 This clause, however
is a power allocation among competing power users governed by the
Constitution; namely, the executive and judiciary at one level and the
states at another. In terms of separation of power, it is Congress and
not the executive or the judiciary who is granted this power. In
terms of federalism, it is similarly Congress and not the states who is
given this power. It is not an ascription of power as between Congress
and the tribes because the Indians were apparently not intended to be
included and were in fact not included within the coverage of the
Constitution. Because of this intransigent limitation, the new federal
government could enforce its will on the Indian tribes in only two
ways: war 12 or treaty.'" As is well known, both methods were in
have the sole power of "regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians.
U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. VI, IX (1778).
8. Article III provided:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their
property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in
just and lawful wars authorised by Congress; but laws founded in justice and
humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to
them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.
Northwest Territory Ordinance & Act, 1 Stat. 51, 52 (1797).
9. There is nothing in the reports of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which James
Madison, Rufus King, William Paterson, and Alexander Hamilton wrote, to indicate that the
Indians were given much attention. The Indians are mentioned several times in The Federalist,
but nothing relates to the status of the tribes. THE FEDERALIST (J. Cooke ed. 1961). It is
difficult to verify an omission, and more difficult to cite authority. Perhaps it suffices to
conclude that none of the authorities I perused made reference to anything more significant
than what is expressly found in the Constitution itself.
10. In article I, "Indians not taxed" are excluded from the enumeration of persons within
a state for determining the population of the state for purposes of apportioning both direct
taxes and representatives to serve in the House. The fourteenth amendment contains an
identical exclusion for apportioning representatives. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. Neither the power of war nor the power of treaty mentions Indians, but both are
designed to cover nations that are not within the scope of the Constitution. "When the
Constitution was adopted, the chief mode of dealing with Indians was warfare. Accordingly
Indian affairs were entrusted to the War Department by the Act of August 7, 1789, the first
law of Congress relating to Indians." F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 93
(1971).
13. Prior to the 1871 cutoff date, the United States made 389 treaties with the Indian
tribes. Id. at v (Reference Tables and Index) (referring to the Department of Interior's first
"comprehensive attempt" to collect basic Indian material).
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common use. The Indian commerce clause, however, was not an
empty vessel. Congress used the clause to support legislation, but
only concerning matters of commerce and then only to the extent that
American, in contrast to Indian, interests were implicated.' 4 The sole
deviation from this pattern, prior to the 1885 law that gave rise to the
Kagama case, was an 1817 act' 5 in which Congress tried to apply
federal criminal law to crimes committed by Indians on Indian land.
In 1834, however, Justice McLean, sitting on circuit, declared this
law unconstitutional.' 6
The United States altered its method of dealing with the tribes in
1871. The House of Representatives, piqued at having to approve
appropriations for countless obligations to the Indians contained in
treaties entered into without its consent, attached a rider to one of its
appropriation bills which provided, "[n]o Indian nation or tribe
within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty."'17 The provision became law
and is still on the books today.' 8 Although the Supreme Court has
never ruled on the constitutionality of the restriction, it has been
faithfully followed.
The change, however, was unilateral and did not affect the status
of the Indians.' 9 No treaties were made with the Indian tribes after
1871. The new approach was to have representatives of either the
President or the Congress make agreements with the Indians which
were then subject to ratification by both houses of Congress. In this
manner the House got its say and the autonomy of the tribes
remained intact.
14. A review of early legislation reveals how carefully Congress avoided legislating in a
way that would interfere with the internal affairs of the tribes. See id. at 68-77.
15. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383, repealed by Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161,
§ 29, 4 Stat. 734.
16. United States v. Bailey, 24 F. Cas. 937, 940 (C.C. Tenn. 1834) (No. 14,495).
17. Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)).
18. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982).
19. Exparte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 306 (W.D. Ark. 1883); F. COHEN, supra note 12, at 66-67
(1942). On the other hand, in a much later decision a court, without citing any authority,
concluded that the 1871 law asserted "the right of the government thereafter to define the
rights of Indians with or without their consent." United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 114
F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1940). It has been argued that "[a]lthough agreements were still
concluded that were no different from previous treaties except in mode of ratification, the
formal end of treaty making and the conscious intention thereby to denigrate the power of the
chiefs resulted in a loss of old systems of internal order without the substitution of new ones in
their place." 2 F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 676 (1984).
[Vol. 41:409
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL DEATH
IV. THE Kagama CONTEXT
Three years before Kagama, the Supreme Court decided the case
of Ex parte Crow Dog.2" This decision led directly to the passing of
the law that was challenged in Kagama. Crow Dog, a Sioux Indian
living on the Rosebud reservation in the Dakota territory, killed a
Sioux chief who had made the compound mistake of extending his
congenial ways to both the United States government and the wives of
other Sioux leaders.2 The families of the participants resolved the
dispute in traditional Sioux fashion: Crow Dog's family compensated
the family of the deceased. Influential Americans were not happy
with the result. Not only was a friend and political ally of the United
States murdered, but the killer went virtually unpunished. Thus, the
federal government acted. Crow Dog was arrested, tried for murder
in the First Judicial District Court of Dakota, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death. The Supreme Court entertained Crow Dog's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.22
The Court granted Crow Dog's petition because the federal court
had no jurisdiction.23 Although an agreement between the United
States and the Sioux tribe contained the provision, "[the Indians] shall
be subject to the laws of the United States,"24 the Court concluded
that this language was not clear enough to, in effect, repeal the federal
statute,25 which provided that the criminal laws of the United States
shall not extend to "crimes committed by one Indian against the per-
son or property of another Indian. '26 The next year, 1884, a bill was
introduced in Congress that would have applied federal criminal law
to crimes committed by Indians against Indians on Indian land. The
Senate killed it, apparently, because it applied to misdemeanors as
well as felonies.27 In 1885, however, a similar bill was passed without
the misdemeanor provision. It provided in relevant part:
[A]ll such Indians committing murder against the person . . . of
another Indian . . . within the boundaries of any State of the
United States, and within the limits of any Indian reservation, shall
be subject to the same laws, tried in the same courts and in the
same manner, and subject to the same penalties as are all other
20. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
21. This version of the facts is based on the narration in V. DELORIA, JR. & C. LYTLE,
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 168-69 (1983).
22. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
23. Id. at 572.
24. Act of Feb. 28, 1877, ch. 72, art. 8, 19 Stat. 254, 256.
25. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 568-72.
26. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846) (quoting Act of June 30, 1834,
ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982))).
27. 16 Cong. Rec. 935 (1885) (statement of Rep. Budd).
1986]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:409
persons committing [murder] within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States.28
Crow Dog may have been the trigger for the new legislation, but
it was only part of a larger drive to civilize the Indians. Not only were
their criminal punishments too light in the eyes of some critics, but at
times too savage. 29 The reformers argued that what the Indians
needed, for their own good, was the installation of American law and
procedure. 0 Other reformers went further and argued for the aboli-
tion of the tribes and their culture and for the assimilation of Indians
into the mainstream American way of life.3 ' This, again, was for their
own good. With foe and friend united3 2 in a national political goal of
turning red into white, whatever countervailing movement existed to
preserve Indian tribal sovereignty, with its accompanying indepen-
dence, values, and history, was a movement out of step with the beat
of the times.
Into this reform milieu came Kagama.
V. THE BARE-BONES CASE
Kagama, an Indian, was indicted under the new 1885 federal law,
along with his accomplice Mahawaha, in August of 1885 for the mur-
der of an Indian, Iyouse, on the Hoopa Valley Indian reservation in
California. 3   The defendants demurred to the charge on the ground
that Congress did not have constitutional power to enact the law.
28. Appropriations Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385, repealed by Act
of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, § 5, 29 Stat. 487.
29. One congressman observed that the Indians frequently responded to a murder by
having the "blood avenger," the next of kin of the deceased, retaliate by committing a new
murder. 16 Cong. Rec. 934 (1885) (statement of Rep. Cutcheon).
30. Professor James Bradley Thayer of the Harvard Law School was "the most vigorous"
advocate of this position. F. PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 238 (1981).
He drafted a bill and had it introduced in Congress. It proved to be too thorough and radical
for even some of the reformers. See 2 F. PRUCHA, supra note 19, at 679-81.
31. For a discussion of this movement, see 2 F. PRUCHA, supra note 19, at 611-71.
32. Although benevolent reform groups may have been the prime forces behind the policy,
other groups were interested in Indian land. Perhaps it is fair to say that "[i]gnorance of
Indian culture, fatuous self-righteousness, and land hunger combined" to accomplish the
national goal. W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 249 (1975).
33. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 376 (1886). Commentators have argued that
"[t]he Hoopas had no existing tribal government that could have enforced the tribal penalty
had they wished to exert tribal jurisdiction over this particular crime." V. DELORIA, JR. & C.
LYTLE, supra note 21, at 171. No authority is cited for this proposition and the significance of
it is questionable. For example, it was reported in 1877 that the Hoopas "have well-established
laws, or rather usages, as to ... laws of murder, injury, and insulting words .... Murder is
generally compounded for by the payment of shell-money." S. POWERS, TRIBES OF
CALIFORNIA 74-75 (1976). It was easy to assume that the California Indians did not have
enforcement mechanisms because they were organized in much smaller units than the
traditional tribes found elsewhere in the country.
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The two circuit court judges split on the issue and by certificate of
division of opinion the case went directly to the Supreme Court of the
United States.34
The defendants argued to the Court that the only source of con-
gressional power over the Indians in the Constitution was the Indian
commerce clause as supplemented by the necessary and proper clause.
The defendants further pointed out that these powers, although
extremely broad, did not authorize Congress to reach a crime of mur-
der unrelated to commerce committed by one Indian against another
Indian on an Indian reservation.35 History supported this position,
they argued. The "anomalous and peculiar" status of the Indian
tribes "has not been changed nor has it been construed to be in any
wise different than when defined by Chief Justice Marshall in the
Cherokee case."3 6 The defendant's conclusion was that "[iun all the
dealings of our Government with the Indians they have always been
carried on either by open warfare or by commercial relation. 3 7
The government responded that the commerce clause with the
necessary and proper adjunct was broad enough to support the legis-
lation.3" After tracing congressional laws and Supreme Court cases,
the state concluded "that there is no limitation upon the power of
Congress to enact whatever laws may be necessary to regulate the
affairs of the Indian tribes."39 As for the specific application of the
commerce power to murder, the government argued:
If we are asked in what respect the commission of a crime by an
Indian upon an Indian can relate to the question of intercourse
with an Indian tribe, we deem it sufficient answer to say that if we
have to maintain intercourse with the Indians, it is necessary and
proper to provide that they shall not be permitted to destroy each
other.4°
On the commerce issue, the Supreme Court sided with the
defendants. It saw that to impose a common law crime against the
Indians without any showing of its relationship to commerce "would
be a very strained construction"4 of the commerce clause. The Court
itself, however, made the arguments which enabled the government to
34. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 375.
35. Brief for Defendant at 11, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (No. 1246) (1886).
36. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)).
37. Id. at 12.
38. Brief for United States at 14, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (No. 1246)
(1886).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 24.
41. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378.
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prevail. It first denied to the tribes the status of a nation.42 It then
drew two conclusions from the fact that the tribes were geographi-
cally within the United States: one, because there were only two sov-
ereigns within the United States, states and the federal government,
the tribes were subject to the jurisdiction of one or the other43 and
two, because the federal government must have power over all the
territory it owns, it may exercise that power to regulate not only the
land, but persons located on it.44 The fact that the federal government
had a responsibility toward the Indians also supported this result.45
In conclusion, the congressional law was valid, the federal court
in California had jurisdiction, and the Indian tribes lost their
autonomy.
VI. THE CASE ELABORATED
Given the result in Kagama, a student of the law of both the
American Indian and the Constitution might conclude that the
Supreme Court of that day was either incompetent, biased, or nod-
ding. None of the above is probably the best answer. "The Court as
it was constituted from 1882 until the death of Judge Woods in 1887
stood at a remarkably high level of distinction. Five or six of its mem-
bers would find places in any respectable list of the outstanding jus-
tices in the entire annals of the Court."4 6 As for bias, if any was
instrumental, it ironically, was pro-Indian. There is nothing to show
the contrary. The language of the opinion and the mood of the times
suggest that the Court was simply following the national reformist
thinking then in vogue. The Court sat on the states and neutralized
the tribes, but only so it could free Congress to proceed with civilizing
the Indians. Maybe the Court nodded. The arguments of counsel did
not focus the Judge's attention. Perhaps they missed the issue. This
is doubtful though, as there was not one concurrence nor one dissent.
That they all may have nodded in unison is easy enough to imagine,
but hard to believe. Furthermore, the Court's opinion itself, refutes
the notion that the Court was asleep at the bench. What went wrong
in Kagama, in lieu of one of the above, is that the Court erred in both
its analysis of reality and its formulation of constitutional policy.
The Court's first conclusion in its two part analysis, that the
tribes were not nations, will not withstand scrutiny. As a matter of
42. Id. at 379.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 380.
45. Id. at 384-85.
46. C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 388 (1939).
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fact, the only discussion in the Court's opinion of the subject con-
cluded that they were not "foreign" nations-a point not in dispute
and one made fifty-five years earlier in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia."
In that same opinion, however, Chief Justice Marshall had called the
tribes "domestic dependent nations."4 In Kagama, the Court down-
graded this language and with it the status of the tribes into "local
dependent communities."49 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court
attempt to refute Chief Justice Marshall's analysis in the second of the
two famous Georgia cases, Worcester v. Georgia,0 in which the Chief
Justice had not only referred numerous times5 to the Indian tribes as
"nations", but carefully explained and justified the reference.52 In
Kagama, by judicial fiat without argument or reliance on authority,
Indian nationhood, an accepted legal status for over 300 years, simply
disappeared.
In the second part of its analysis, the Court found that within the
geographical limits of the United States there were but two sover-
eigns-the states and the federal government. The tribes were left
out. Although "nation" and "sovereign" are often viewed as synony-
mous, the Court treated them separately, perhaps because the states
are considered to be one, but not the other. In any event, the Court
rejected the conclusion that there are three American sovereigns as
easily as it denied the tribes their status as nations,53 but the Court's
fiat on this issue was just as faulty as its earlier one. Chief Justice
Marshall in Worcester had traced the history of tribal authority and
repeatedly noted throughout his opinion that "[t]he Indian nations
had always been considered as distinct, independent political commu-
nities,"54 and "[t]he very fact of repeated treaties with [the Indians]
recognises [their right to self government]; and the settled doctrine of
47. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 13 (1832).
48. Id. at 17.
49. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382.
50. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
51. I stopped counting at twenty.
52.
The very term "nation", so generally applied to [the Indians] means "a people
distinct from others." The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as
well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently
admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The
words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected in our
diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and
well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied
them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60.
53. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379.
54. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
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the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its inde-
pendence-its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection. '5 5 In Kagama, no effort was
made to challenge either the statements of historical fact in Worcester
or the authorities on which they were based. The Court simply
ignored them.
The resolution of the issues on nationhood and sovereignty
against the tribes meant that they were mere groups of Indians living
in the United States and subject to governmental control by either the
states or the federal government, whichever had the constitutional
authority. The Court spent most of its opinion on this power ques-
tion. As already indicated, this may have been due to the fact that
congressional power under the Constitution was the only issue that
the parties briefed. Although the State based its argument solely on
the commerce clause, the Court found congressional authority outside
the powers enumerated in the commerce and property clauses. It
relied partially on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in American Insur-
ance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton 56 in which he wrote, "[t]he right to
govern, may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire ter-
ritory."57 In addition it relied on another ground:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is nec-
essary to their protection .... It must exist in that government,
because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of
its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce
its laws on all the tribes.58
Taken together the congressional power source seems to be a compos-
ite of an inherent power over land and a necessary power over a weak,
dependent people. Not only is this duo an odd couple but it under-
mines traditional learning that the Constitution limits the authority of
Congress to enumerated powers.
Neither the fact that the Court considered congressional power
the most important issue in the case, nor the Court's debatable basis
for finding it, should be allowed to detract from the major omission in
the case-the Court's failure to confront, analyze, and resolve the
relationship between the Constitution and the Indian tribes. In other
words, the question of consequence in the case was not the power of
55. Id. at 560-61.
56. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
57. Id. at 542.
58. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85.
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Congress under the Constitution, but the power of the Constitution
itself.
It is understandable why the Court glossed over the issue- there
was little support for its conclusion. As history, the Constitution, the
Worcester case, and the Senate judiciary committee 9 attest, the
Indian tribes were not subject to the reach of the Constitution.
Two items of evidence that superficially support the Court
deserve mention. One is the Supreme Court opinion that Chief Jus-
tice Taney wrote in United States v. Rogers.60 This case, decided in
1846, concerned the constitutionality of a federal law making murder
of a white man by a white man in Indian country a federal offense.
The defendant, a white man, argued that he had married an Indian,
lived among the Indians, and had been adopted by the tribe. He made
the same argument on behalf of the victim. Thus, he argued he came
within the statutory exemption that provided that the law "shall not
extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or prop-
erty of another Indian. ' ' 61 The Court, conceding he might be a mem-
ber of the tribe, rejected his contention that he was an Indian as
contemplated by the statute.62 In short, he was still white. That the
Constitution and a congressional law under it may be applied to a
white man who later joins a tribe is not authority for the application
of federal laws to Indians who are tribal members. Rather, this is
simply an application of the nationality principle of criminal law
jurisdiction, recognized in international law then and now.63 What is
interesting about Rogers is not the holding of the case, but the free-
wheeling observations of Chief Justice Taney concerning the Ameri-
can Indian. For example:
The native tribes who were found on this continent at the time of
its discovery have never been acknowledged or treated as
independent nations by the European governments, nor regarded
as the owners of the territories they respectively occupied. On the
contrary, the whole continent was divided and parcelled out, and
granted by the governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and
unoccupied land, and the Indians continually held to be, and
59. "An Act of Congress which should assume to treat the members of a tribe as subject to
the municiple jurisdiction of the United States would be unconstitutional and void." Thayer,
A People Without Law, 68 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 676, 677 (1891) (quoting F. WALKER, THE
INDIAN QUESTION 125 (1874)).
60. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
61. Id. at 572 (quoting Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982)).
62. Id. at 571-72.
63. See 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 654-65 (1985); R. LEFLAR,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 196-97 (1959); F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 189 (1874).
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treated as, subject to their dominion and control.64
and
It is due to the United States, however, to say, that while they have
maintained the doctrines upon this subject which had been previ-
ously established by other nations, and insisted upon the same
powers and dominion within their territory, yet, from the very
moment the general government came into existence to this time, it
has exercised its power over this unfortunate race in the spirit of
humanity and justice, and has endeavoured by every means in its
power to enlighten their minds and increase their comforts, and to
save them if possible from the consequences of their own vices. 61
and finally,
[W]e think it too firmly and clearly established to admit of dispute,
that the Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the
United States are subject to their authority, and ... Congress may
by law punish any offence committed there, no matter whether the
offender be a white man or an Indian.66
The Chief Justice cited no authority in support of his exegesis on the
American Indian. The opinion reads more like a dream than reality.
Perhaps it was. President Jackson, who appointed Taney as Chief
Justice, held, it has been argued, similar views: that the Indians
should be treated fairly, that relocating tribes to the west was the only
sensible solution to white-red conflicts, and that to treat with the
tribes instead of making them subject to municipal laws was absurd.67
Perhaps Chief Justice Taney was articulating a political dream that
many hoped would become reality. In any event, he was not describ-
ing the law as it was. Rogers thus, fails as meaningful support for
Kagama for two obvious reasons-it is dicta and it is wrong.
A second kind of support comes from the bare fact that Congress
passed the law. A "presumption" of constitutionality is said to attach
to such matters. 6' Although this idea may be honored more in theory
than in practice, 69 the fact that Congress has considered the constitu-
64. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. The traditional view is that President Jackson hated the Indians and acted
accordingly. The position stated in the text is a softer revisionist view presented in F.
PRUCHA, supra note 30, at 138-52.
68. This "presumption" is not an operative doctrine that has a particular meaning and
that produces a particular result. It is simply a way of acknowledging that Congress, when it
passes laws, is functioning under the Constitution and that this should be considered by any
court before it declares a congressional law unconstitutional.
69. The Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, was silent on the matter even though it
was dealing with a Congress made up of numerous individuals who actually drafted the
Constitution. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). On the other hand, the Court made much of this
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tionality of a particular bill before transforming it into law, especially
if it relates to a subject that ostensibly is within its power, is entitled to
some weight. The 1885 law, however, does not qualify. First, the pro-
vision was a rider to an appropriation bill and was introduced on the
floor of the House. 70 It was not even considered by the Appropria-
tions Committee, let alone by any other more knowledgeable commit-
tees such as the Committee on Indian Affairs.7' Second, the
discussion in the House did not once allude to the question of either
legislative or constitutional power. Third, the Senate reacted to the
constitutional aspects of the proposal with a similar silent treatment.72
On these facts, there is no basis for a presumption of constitutionality.
VII. So WHAT?
So what if Kagama is wrong? A dirge on tribal death written a
century after internment is not likely to start a movement to correct
the error and liberate the tribes from federal authority. On the other
hand, suppose the Indians were given the option to either remain as is
or return to true sovereignty. A few tribes might opt for their inde-
pendence. Maybe several small ones unable to grab the opportunity
alone would join together to make a nation. Would such an attempt
be feasible? I do not know. All the current federal laws applicable to
any tribe choosing the new status would have to be reviewed. Those
to which the tribe consented, then or now, would probably be main-
tained. Those based on proper constitutional and congressional
authority would also not be affected. Only those beyond the Constitu-
tion and based in effect on Kagama would have to be voided. There-
after, mutual consent would be required to bind the tribes.
But could all the federal laws be identified today? The task of
isolating the numerous statutes and regulations may not be as formi-
dable as first thought makes it seem. In the first place, Indian law has
always been treated as sui generis and thus laws relating to the tribes
are legislated and cataloged separately. Secondly, even under the cur-
rent regime, all laws applicable to any given tribe must be identifiable
to ascertain the current status of the tribe-United States relationship.
Thirdly, The Bureau of Indian Affairs has been monitoring the tribes
fact in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Both opinions are the
handiwork of Chief Justice John Marshall.
70. 16 Cong. Rec. 934 (1885) (statement of Rep. Cutcheon).
71. 16 Cong. Rec. 2386 (1885) (statement of Sen. Plumb).
72. These conclusions are based on a perusal of the relevant sections of the Congressional
Record. The Senate's great concern with the law was the procedural method used by the
House, an appropriations rider, and not with the law's substance. See 16 Cong. Rec. 2385-87
(1885) (Senate discussion).
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and administering federal laws for a long time. Even if the Bureau
does not now have the information collated by tribe, it could perhaps
make the necessary rearrangement with reasonable effort and within a
reasonable time. Assuming the new legal relationship for the future
could be accomplished, there would still be the problem of what to do
with the past-those events that over the years have vested, rested, or
nested, so to speak. I am not convinced the idea is workable, but
neither am I convinced it is not. A feasibility study would be
helpful."'
An acknowledgement that Kagama erroneously denied Ameri-
can Indian tribes their dual status as nations and sovereigns might
have a salutary effect on those Supreme Court Justices who appear to
be in search of reasons why the tribes today should be granted the
unusual advantage of being "sovereigns-at-the-will-of-Congress. '7 4
This observation relates to the fact that the present Court often allows
the tribes to function as sovereigns in the absence of congressional law
to the contrary. 75 It is a judicial device for giving the tribes govern-
mental authority over tribal members7 6 and sometimes non-mem-
bers;77 and it serves as a limitation on the power of states to apply
their laws to the tribes.78 Some on the Court are uneasy with this
73. The idea is less fanciful today than before John Collier had his day. Actually, his
influence was for a bit more than a day. For years he was a harsh critic of the way the United
States dealt with the Indians; and then for twelve years, longer than any person before or after,
he was Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Under Franklin D. Roosevelt he helped the Indians
get a "new deal." "The emphasis ... on tribal government made possible the perpetuation of
the concept of tribal sovereignty .. " 2 F. PRUCHA, supra note 19, at 1011. And the concept
of tribal sovereignty, even conditioned as it is on the will of Congress, makes it easier to think
of tribal sovereignty without the condition.
74. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, and
O'Connor joined Justice Marshall's strong "sovereignty" opinion. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The
next year, however, Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court in New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, softened his sovereignty analysis considerably by turning it into one
of preemption. 462 U.S. 324, 334-36 (1983). By so doing, he picked up the support of Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stevens and Rehnquist. He was also able to retain the support of
Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor. In another 1983 case, Rice v. Rehner, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Powell and the three dissenters in Merrion, created a
modified preemption analysis. 463 U.S. 713 (1983). The bottom line as of 1983 is that the
Justices who advocate Indian sovereignty are feeling pressure from those on the Court who
favor a preemption alternative. In short, sovereignty supporters need help.
75. E.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (tribal sovereignty allows
tribes taxing power over non-Indians on reservation); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978) (tribal sovereign immunity recognized); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313
(1978) (double jeopardy inapplicable to double criminal prosecutions by United States and a
tribe).
76. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 57 (1978).
77. E.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
78. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
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idea and would do away with it as an anachronism and a fiction.7 9
Reflections on Kagama could inspire those Justices whose faith in the
current approach is weakening or dead to refresh their thoughts and
renew their efforts to maintain what is left of the sovereignty perspec-
tive-as bizarre and illogical as it is. Some sovereignty is better than
none.
A third reason for rethinking Kagama is that it may lead to com-
pensatory action by Congress. Money is always a possibility. Beyond
that, however, Congress could confess error and admit the United
States was wrong. Although the status quo ante Kagama may not be
feasible, a recognition by Congress of the true tribal status could
renew a sense of pride and self-esteem among the Indians. This is the
remedy of restitution at its best.
Finally, Kagama should be remembered as one more item on the
long litany of injustices to the American Indian."° That the case may
have emasculated the tribes inadvertently and for their own good
makes it worse in the sense that we did not think enough of them to
realize what we were doing. Sometimes the unkindest cut is indiffer-
ence. Whether or not it is too late to rectify the mistakes of Kagama
for the benefit of the Indians, it is not too late to set the record
straight for the benefit of the rest of us.
79. In Rice v. Rehner, Justice O'Connor for the majority made it clear that sovereignty is
dispensable: "[I]f... we determine that the balance of state, federal, and tribal interests so
requires, our preemption analysis may accord less weight to the 'backdrop' of tribal
sovereignty." 463 U.S. 713, 721 (1983). In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, Justice
Rehnquist, in summarizing his position, quoted the language from Kagama that denied
sovereignty status to Indian tribes. 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978). Again Justice Rehnquist, in a
dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and Stevens, stated his perspective that "apart
from those rare instances in which the State attempts to interfere with the residual sovereignty
of a tribe to govern its own members, the 'tradition of tribal sovereignty' merely provides a
'backdrop' against which the pre-emptive effect of federal statutes or treaties must be
assessed." Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 848 (1982)
(emphasis added). Rarely does a Justice admit disenchantment as directly and simply as
Justice Blackmun did when he wrote, "I entertain doubts, however, about the continuing
vitality in this day of the doctrine of tribal immunity." Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of
Game, 433 U.S. 165, 178 (1977).
80. Although there may be disagreement concerning the extent of the injustices, that they
existed and in great numbers is beyond question. For an interesting narrative on injustices
concerning the Sioux and their loss of the Black Hills of South Dakota, see United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
19861
